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The well-known and oft-pronounced philosophy
of the judicial system applied to juveniles-the
juvenile court-is couched in evangelical terms.
That the juvenile court's purpose is to provide sal-
vation for tender youths who tend toward crime,
for whatever reason, is one of the earliest of these
philosophical statements.' Thus the earliest think-
ers, pondering the justification for treating juvenile
criminal offenders differently from adults, con-
cluded that the parens patriae doctrine was the
legal underpinning of such a system.2 This doctrine,
that the state should offer a shield and guidance
for those of tender years in need thereof, also pro-
vided the theory necessary to permit the court to
treat of other family problems such as custody of
children, parental miscare or misconduct, and pa-
ternity determinations
Whatever the technical justification, it is now
almost beyond dispute that juveniles should be
treated differently from adults in matters relating
to their well-being. 4 The real dispute relates to the
degree of differential treatment that a juvenile
should receive, particularly when he is brought
1 See, e.g., Rule v. Geddes, 23 U.S. App. D.C. 31,
48 (1904) (Reform School for Girls described as place
where girls may be kept under reasonable restraint
during their minority, not as punishment for crime, but
for their moral and physical well-being); Common-
wealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 62 At. 198 (1905) (juve-
nile court act said not to be for punishment of offenders
but for the salvation of children).
2 See, e.g., Ex parte Januszeuski, 196 Fed. 123 (S.D.
Ohio 1911); Lindsay v. Lindsay, 257 II. 328, 100 N.E.
892 (1913); Farnham v. Pierce, 141 Mass. 203, 6 N.E.
830 (1886); Commonwealth v. Fisher, supra note 1;
In re Johnson, 173 Wis. 571, 181 N.W. 741 (1921).
See Ketcham, The Unfufilled Promise of the
Juvenile Court, 7 CRm & DELINQUENCY 97, 97-100
(1961).
4 The differential treatment of juveniles in courts of
law came to this country from England, see Ketcham,
supra note 3 at 98-99. The mere fact of the acceptance
of this concept, coupled with the existence of a separate
legal system of justice for the juvenile for nearly three
quarters of a century indicates the acceptance of the
proposition that juveniles deserve non-adult treatment
in our courts.
before the court for an antisocial act or course of
conduct.' It is apparent that the goals of a system
of juvenile court justice would be thwarted, if not
completely deterred, if such a socio-quasi-judicial
institution were subjected to all of the stringent
common law and constitutional requirements of a
traditional legal proceeding. 6 Especially thwarting
are those legal rules which serve to protect a crim-
inal-accused in the usual administration of crim-
inal justiceY
The conflict between traditional rights of those
5 Implicit in even the most critical attacks upon the
juvenile court system is the acceptance of the funda-
mental concept of treating juveniles differently from
adults. The real bone of contention is the degree of
differential treatment. Thus critics assail deprivation of
particular rights of juveniles, and when too horrified by
what they find, advocate abolition of the system because
unable to see a satisfactory alternative. For an analysis
of specific problems in the juvenile court system with
a discussion of criticisms of the system see Paulsen,
Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 MnN. L. REv. 547
(1957). Professor Paulsen's approach to juvenile court
shortcomings is illustrative of the approach here
referred to; criticism of the system is objectively
stated in specific terms without a blind cry for its
abolition. Professor Paulsen states: "This article is an
attempt to discover what courts can do to protect the
rights of the child more adequately without sacrificing
the very real benefits of our courts for children." Id. at
550.
6 It is not suggested that the juvenile court system is
inherently unsuited for dispensing justice in a legal or
constitutional manner. Rather, it is here recognized
that to achieve its goals, a juvenile court must be
capable of a flexibility which would be impossible if all
of the rules which confine a legal proceeding to a specific
form were imposed upon a juvenile court proceeding.
7 The rules governing a criminal proceeding are more
restrictive upon the court than in other proceedings
because of the desire to give the individual the greatest
possible protection against the forces of the state
brought to bear upon him. See Paulsen, supra note 5 at
561: "[the privilege against self-incrimination] is tied to
the accusatorial scheme of the criminal law. It is an
expression of the dignity of the accused although the
collective power of the state is ranged against him."
Given the juvenile court's concern for the well-being of
children, such rules, if applied with the same absolute-
ness as in a criminal case, could be detrimental to the
operation of the juvenile court system.
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accused of criminal acts and the philosophy of the
juvenile court system has centered about such
issues as the right to trial by jury,8 the assistance
of counsel,9 the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion,10 the right to bail n the protection against
double jeopardy,u and the application of the strict
rules of criminal evidence."
In order to achieve its goals, the juvenile court
required some means of overcoming these string-
encies. Consequently all proceedings before the
juvenile court were termed "civil," rather than
"criminal."' 4 This made it possible for the juvenile
court to go about its business with considerable
freedom. Critics have asserted, however, that
merely calling juvenile court proceedings "civil"
does not make them so; that certain of the tradi-
tional procedural requirements are vitally neces-
sary in juvenile court proceedings.15 The basic
issue is a test of "due process of law."'
6
One of the many questions involved in the "due
process" issue is the function of collateral attack of
8 Not all juvenile court acts deny trial by jury; e.g.,
the Juvenile Court of the District of Columbia must
provide a jury when demanded, D.C. CODE, tit. 16,
S2307 (Supp. m 11964). For a survey of cases dealing
with the constitutionality of lack of jury trial in the
juvenile courts see 67 A.L.R. 1082 (1930).
9 The question whether the right to counsel exists, or
should exist, in the juvenile court has engendered a
great deal of comment. See, e.g., Isaacs, The Role of the
Lawyer in Representing Minors in the New York Family
Court, 12 BuFxr.o L. Rxv. 501 (1963); Paulsen, supra
note 5 at 568-73. The present constitutional status
given the right to counsel by the Supreme Court's
decision in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)
makes this question even more important.
"0 See Antieau, Constitutional Rights in Juvenile
Courts, 46 CORN. L. Q. 387, 407-08 (1961).
11 See, e.g., id. at 393-94; Paulsen, supra note 5 at
532.
" See, e.g., Antieau, supra note 10 at 395-98;
Sheridan, Double Jeopardy and Waiver in Juvenile
Delinquency Proceedings, 23 FED. PROB., Dec. 1959,p. 43.
" See, e.g., Beemsterboer, The Juvenile Court'-
Benevolence in Star Chamber, J. Cans. L., C. & P.S.
464, 473 (1960) in regard to the exclusion of hearsay,
the most controversial of the rules of criminal evidence
in the juvenile court setting.
14 For an excellent discussion of the theory that
juvenile court proceedings are not non-criminal in the
delinquency area see Antieau, supra note 10 at 388-89.
15 Professor Paulsen, for example, points out that
"We cannot take away precious legal protection simply
by changing names from 'criminal prosecution' to
'delinquency proceedings.'" Paulsen, supra note 5 at
550.
16 Clearly a child "is entitled to due process of law
whether the juvenile court administers civil or criminal
justice." Ibi. See also Shioutakon v. District of
Columbia, 114 A.2d 896, 899 (D.C. Mun. App. 1954)
where a motion to vacate a juvenile court commitment
was denied on the ground that the movant was afforded
due process of law.
a juvenile court commitment upon a finding of
delinquency. 17 The traditional method of collat-
erally questioning a loss of personal liberty is by a
writ of habeas corpus. In federal jurisdictions a
motion to vacate a sentence, under 28 U.S.C. §2255,
is appropriate for that purpose.us
Generally, collateral attack of a court's decision
via habeas corpus is not limited to criminal cases:
such methods of collateral attack may serve in both
civil and criminal cases 9 Consequently, the juve-
nile court is not saved from collateral review of its
decisions by merely pointing out that civil and not
criminal rules apply to proceedings before it. How-
ever, habeas corpus, or the alternative Section
2255 motion, enables one invoking it to obtain in-
dependent judicial inquiry into whether the juve-
nile court has failed to accord fundamental consti-
tutional rights to a child.2° Since what is questioned
is restriction of individual liberty through incar-
ceration, the inquiring court should not find much
difficulty in throwing aside the label for the pro-
ceeding which led to the incarceration.n
Collateral attack by habeas corpus may force a
consideration of the claimed rights of a juvenile
offender in a completely different context than
17 Since habeas corpus has long been accepted as a
proper form for attacking custody determinations of a
juvenile court, that question will not be considered in
this paper. Early cases settled the availability of the
Writ for that purpose. See, e.g., New York Foundling
Hospital v. Gatti, 203 U.S. 429 (1906). Moreover the
propriety of habeas corpus to determine custody has
even been recognized by statute, see D.C. CODE, tit. 11,
§ 907 (1961).
is28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1958) [hereinafter referred to in
footnotes and text as Section 2255].
The guaranty of the privilege of habeas corpus,
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2, in no way limits the Writ
to detentions arising out of "criminal" proceedings.
Even if different forms of the Writ exist to achieve
purposes other than release from illegal detention, see
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 399-400 n.5 (1963), there is
no authority for it being available only to inquire into
"criminal" detentions. See O'Beirne v. Overholser, 109
U.S. App. D.C. 279, 287 F.2d 137 (1960).
20 See notes 33-39 infra and accompanying text for a
discussion of some of the constitutional rights which
have been held assertable via habeas corpus.
21 The prestige of the Writ lends credence to the
disposition of a court to cut through labels for detention
in inquiring into the legality thereof. Fay v. Noia,
supra note 19, at 399-400. Thus the Writ has recently
been utilized to obtain bail, in traditional fashion, in a
juvenile case in the District of Columbia, Trimble v.
Stone, 187 F. Supp. 483 (D.D.C. 1960). Habeas corpus
has also been used in other "civil" commitment cases:
e.g., O'Beirne v. Overholser, supra notp 19 (confine-
ment in mental institution after acquittal of crime by
reason of insanity); Miller v. Overholser, 92 U.S. App.
D.C. 110, 206 F.2d 415 (1953) (pre-trial commitment in
mental institution as a sexual psychopath).
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that of the juvenile court setting, and in conse-
quence it may yield a different result.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the use
of collateral attack as a device to obtain review of
juvenile court decisions and to determine what
role, if any, such attack should play in the juve-
nile court system. Habeas corpus will be the col-
lateral attack device examined because of its uni-
versal applicability and fairly uniform nature.
2 2
The federal substitute for habeas corpus, a Section
2255 motion, will also be discussed because of the
particular problems it presents in the District of
Columbia.
HABEAS CORPUS AND SECTION 2255:
GENERAL LEGAL TmORy
Habeas corpus, the Great Writ, is one of the
basic constitutional privileges accorded citizens of
the United States. With roots reaching far into
Anglo-American jurisprudence, the Great Writ
carries extraordinary prestige.22 Unlike the many
privileges and freedoms later incorporated in the
Bill of Rights, the privilege of habeas corpus was
given explicit recognition in the original body of
the Federal Constitution.4 Throughout the judicial
history of this country, the highest courts have con-
tinually reiterated the duty of the judiciary to
maintain the privilege unimpaired.
2 5
One of the purposes of habeas corpus, and that
for which it has most been used in the United
States, is to inquire into illegal detention with a
view to an order releasing the petitioner.2 6 The
United States Supreme Court has said of the Writ:
Although in form the Great Writ is simply a
mode of procedure, its history is inextricably
intertwined with the growth of personal liberty.
For its function has been to provide a prompt
and efficacious remedy for whatever society
deems to be intolerable restraints. Its root princi-
ple is that in a civilized society, government
must always be accountable to the judiciary for
a man's imprisonment: if the imprisonment can-
not be shown to conform with the fundamental
2 The constitutional status of habeas corpus leads to
its universal availability in the United States to ques-
tion alleged violations of federal constitutional safe-
guards. However, the Writ may not be available uni-
formly from state to state, each state being able to
define habeas corpus as it pleases. See notes 28-32 infra
and accompanying text.
22 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 399-400 n.5 (1963).
24 U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, cl. 2.
25 See Fay v. Noia, supra note 23, at 400 and cases
cited therein.26 Ibid.
requirements of law, the individual is entitled
his immediate release.27
Although habeas corpus has been used to ques-
tion detention in federal cases based upon judicial
decisions alleged to be without jurisdiction, con-
trary to due process of law, or excessive of the com-
mitting court's authority or discretion, the scope
of the Writ at the state level may be narrower.8
Whether the Supreme Court's holding that the
scope of habeas corpus is not limited to question-
ing the committing court's jurisdiction2 is appli-
cable, or will be applied to the states as a consti-
tutional mandate is not clear.3° But even if an area
of habeas corpus jurisdiction remains within the
primary control of the states, it is apparent that
the federal standards for applying federal habeas
corpus relief may be invoked in a federal forum
where state action impinges upon federally pro-
tected individual rights.2' In other words, even
though habeas corpus relief may only be available
in a given state when the committing court acts
without jurisdiction, a prisoner may ultimately
test his detention in a federal court as to the
broader areas of violation of due process or abuse
of authority. Doubt does exist, however, as to
whether the Writ may be used to raise procedural
issues, evidentiary questions or other matters
traditionally limited to assertion by direct appeal.
32
Some of the fundamental rights which have been
asserted in federal habeas corpus cases are the
Fifth Amendment grand jury right,2 the federal
right to trial by jury, 4 the privilege against self-
incrimination under the Fifth Amendment,5 the
2
7 Id. at 401-02.
28 For the broad scope of habeas corpus, extending to
violations of due process, see id. at 402-05. For the
narrower scope of habeas corpus in state cases see, e.g.,
Lehman v. Montgomery, 233 Ind. 391, 120 N.E.2d
172 (1954); Ex parte Mould, 162 Mich. 1, 126 N.W.
1049 (1910) [both juvenile court cases; both stating
narrow scope of habeas corpus].
2 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 404, 413-14 (1963).
31 There is no indication that the states may not de-
fine their own habeas corpus remedy, and the scope of
its availability, in any mannner they choose. The effect
of Fay v. No*a, however, is to assure that federal con-
stitutional safeguards may be protected by federal
habeas corpus as an ultimate measure.
31 Pay v. Noia itself resulted from federal relief being
sought after state remedies proved unsatisfactory.
22 Generally, errors committed during a trial may not
be reviewed by collateral attack unless they involve the
jurisdiction of the court or a deprivation of constitu-
tional rights amounting to a denial of the essence of a
fair trial. Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174 (1947); Smith v.
United States, 88 U.S. App. D.C. 80, 187 F.2d 192
(1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 927 (1951).
22 Rx parle Wilson, 114 U.S. 417 (1885).
,3 Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888).35Amdstein v. McCarthy, 254 U.S. 71 (1920).
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right against double jeopardy of the Fifth Amend-
ment,"8 the Sixth Amendment, right to counsel,,"
and, under the Fourteenth Amendment, Due Proc-
ess Clause, freedom from the use of coerced con-
fessions.-" It is possible that the use of evidence
illegally obtained in violation of the Fourth or
Fourteenth Amendments could also be asserted as
grounds for federal habeas corpus.3 9
Before examining the availability of habeas
corpus to attack a juvenile court decision, the fed-
eral substitute for habeas corpus, a motion to va-
cate sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, will be dis-
cussed. Such discussion is undertaken because of
the confusion engendered by this federal remedy
even though the problem only arises in the federal
court system, primarily in the District of Colum-
bia.40
36 Morgan v. Devine, 237 U.S. 632 (1915).
37 Andersen v. Treat, 172 U.S. 24 (1898).
'3 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
39 In light of the decision in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961), use of evidence obtained in violation of the
fourth or fourteenth amendments might well be one of
those violations of fundamental constitutional safe-
guards which may be the basis of federal habeas corpus,
if not otherwise capable of being raised on appeal-
40 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1958) may be utilizedagainst a
"court established by Act of Congress." The prior lan-
guage of the Section provided for its use against a
"Court of the United States," but the language was
changed to the present form by Act of May 24, 1949,
§ 114, 63 Stat. 105. The change was made to effect con-
formity of language and to make it clear that the Section
applies to federal district courts in the territories and
possessions. Burke v. United States, 103 N.2d 347, 349
n.5 (D.C. Mun. App. 1954) citing H.R. REP. No. 352,
81st Congress, 1st Sess. (1949), 2 U.S. CODE CONGRES-
sioNAL. SERviCE 1272 (1949).
Although Section 2255, by its terms, thus does not
apply to the courts of the District of Columbia, its rem-
edy has been adopted by judicial decision in that juris-
diction, Burke v. United States, supra. However the
question arises whether Section 2255 would come into
play in the juvenile court setting in other federal courts.
Since the Section clearly applies to federal courts in the
territories, as well as in the several state districts, it is
conceivable that a federally constituted juvenile court
(similar to that of the District of Columbia) could exist
in a territory. However, the territorial courts are gen-
erally established by the territory itself. For example,
cases involving children in the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico (a territory of the United States) are adjudicated
by courts of the Commonwealth in accordance with the
domestic laws applicable thereto. LAWS OF PUERTO
Rico ANN., tit. 34, ch. 147 (Supp. 1962).
In the territories of the United States, it would be
improbable for Section 2255 relief to be adopted by
judicial decision as was done in the District of Colum-
bia, although it is possible. Thus juvenile court decisions
in a federal territory probably would not engender the
same interplay between habeas corpus and Section 2255
as exists in the District of Columbia.
However, federal courts, including those of the ter-
ritories of the United States, are governed by the federal
laws relating to juvenile delinquency cases. 28 U.S.C.
Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to alleviate
administrative problems created by habeas corpus
in federal courts. Habeas corpus itself may be
brought only in a court of the jurisdiction in which
a prisoner is incarcerated.4' Since a prisoner com-
mitted by a federal court may be sent to a prison
located anywhere in the United States, the court
which hears a habeas corpus petition in federal
cases often is not the court which committed the
petitioner. In such cases all the records of the case
as well as the relevant witnesses and other persons
may be located in another jurisdiction, often a
great distance from the court hearing the habeas
corpus petition. Consequently a federal habeas
corpus proceeding may entail a great administra-
tive burden in obtaining the records and persons
necessary to complete a full evidentiary hearing.
Section 2255 was enacted to ameliorate these
burdens. It requires a prisoner to institute a motion
to vacate sentence in the sentencing court.0 If the
sentencing court is located in a jurisdiction other
than that in which the prisoner is incarcerated,
then the prisoner need only be transferred to the
jurisdiction of the sentencing court, if necessary,4
for a hearing on his motion.
§§ 5031-37 (1958). These statutory provisions are much
more general in nature than most juvenile court acts
and may only be used if the juvenile consents.
28 U.S.C. § 5032 (1958). However, federal courts may,
under this statutory scheme, act as a juvenile court. [It
should be noted that the District Court for the District
of Columbia has another source of power to act as a
juvenile court. The Juvenile Court of the District of
Columbia may waive jurisdiction over a child between
the ages of 16 and 18, when that child is charged with an
offense which if committed by a person 18 or over is a
felony (or if a child of any age is charged with an offense
punishable by death or life imprisonment if committed
by a person 18 or over). In such a case the child is or-
dered held for trial under the regular procedure of the
court which would have jurisdiction of the offense if
committed by a person 18 or over. Then, "the other
court" has the alternative to "exercise the powers con-
ferred upon the Juvenile Court" of the District of Co-
lumbia. D.C. CODE, tit. 11, § 1553 (Supp. IV. 1965).]
Consequently, it is possible for Section 2255 to be uti-
lized in juvenile cases in the federal court system in
jurisdictions other than the District of Columbia.
Since the District of Columbia is the only federal
jurisdiction wherein a traditional juvenile court system
exists which would be most likely to call into play Sec-
tion 2255, further discussion of the Section in federal
juvenile court cases will be limited to those arising under
the juvenile court legislation for the District of Colum-
bia.
41 United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 213 n.15
(1952), citing, Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948).
28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1958).43 The Section provides that a motion thereunder may
be entertained and determined "without requiring the
production of the prisoner at the hearing." 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 (1958). However, the Supreme Court has indi-
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Section 2255 is, in terms, a substitute for habeas
corpus." A federal prisoner may raise those issues
which would be raised by a petition for habeas
corpus only by a Section 2255 motion, unless relief
under Section 2255 would be "inadequate or inef-
fective. ' 45 The only major restriction upon Section
2255 relief, other than the grounds for the motion
(which are subject to the same restrictions as ha-
beas corpus), is that the prisoner must at the time
of the motion be incarcerated under the terms of
the sentence which he is attacking.
46
The major categories, or bases, for Section 2255
relief that have been reflected in the case law, are
ineffective assistance of counsel,47 mental incom-
petence at the time of trial," and the knowing use
of perjured testimony at the trial.4 9 These matters,
cated that where the allegations supporting the motion
involve matters within the personal knowledge of the
prisoner, he must be present at the hearing. Sanders v.
United States, 373 U.S. 1, 21 (1963); Machriboda v.
United States, 368 U.S. 487, 495-96 (1962).
44 Actually, Section 2255 is a required alternative to
habeas corpus. The statute requires relief to be sought
thereunder before habeas corpus will be proper, and in
order for habeas corpus to lie, Section 2255 must be in-
effective, not merely unsuccessful. United States v.
Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952); Barrett v. United States,
285 F.2d 758 (10th Cir. 1960). Thus, in the attack of a
confinement resulting from judicial action which is made
in a criminal-type proceeding, Section 2255 may be said
to be a substitute for habeas corpus. Moreover, it has
been recognized that the Section 2255 remedy was in-
tended to be as broad as habeas corpus. United States
v. Hayman, supra at 217 n.25, quoting from a state-
ment of the Judicial Conference upon the request of the
Chairmen of the House and Senate Judiciary Commit-
tees.
4" 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1958).
46 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1958). See also Heflin v. United
States, 358 U.S. 415 (1959).
17 Ineffective assistance of counsel as a ground for a
Section 2255 motion is an outgrowth of the Supreme
Court's decision in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458
(1938), interpreting the sixth amendment. The general
agreement that this issue may be raised by a Section
2255 motion is indicated by the number of cases dealing
with this allegation in such motions. E.g., Cofield v.
United States, 263 F.2d 686 (9th Cir.), ree'd on other
grounds, 360 U.S. 472 (1959); Mitchell v. United States,
104 U.S. App. D.C. 57, 259 F.2d 787, cert. denied, 358
U.S. 850 (1958). See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255, n.n.287 &
287a (1959 & Supp. 1963) for cases involving ineffective
assistance of counsel under Section 2255.
48 See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 106 U.S. App.
D.C. 169, 270 F.2d 921 (1959); Bell v. United States,
269 F.2d 419 (9th Cir. 1959). See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255,
Anno. n. 289-90 (1959) for cases involving mental in-
competence at trial as the basis for Section 2255 mo-
tions.
49 See, e.g., Sears v. United States, 265 F.2d 301 (5th
Cir. 1959); Dunn v. United States, 259 F.2d 269 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 847 (1959). See 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 2255, Anno. n.282 (1959) for cases involving the
knowing use of perjured testimony at trial as the basis
for Section 2255 motions.
as in the case of habeas corpus, are the ones most
usually asserted because they are not ordinarily
correctable by normal appeal and thus may be
raised by collateral attack.w
The constitutionality of Section 2255 has been
settled by the United States Supreme Court. In the
case of United States v. Hayman," the statute was
attacked as an unconstitutional suspension of ha-
beas corpus." The Court, in upholding Section
2255, stated that since the relief afforded by the
statute is coextensive with that afforded by habeas
corpus, the Great Writ could not be said to be
suspended.n Moreover, the Court pointed out,
habeas corpus would be available notwithstanding
Section 2255 if relief under it were inadequate or
ineffective,
The coextensiveness of relief under Section 2255
with relief under habeas corpus is further indicated
by later Supreme Court language in Sanlers v.
United States.55 In Sanders the Court stated that,
if the prisoner were subject to any substantial
procedural hurdles which would make his remedy
under Section 2255 less swift and imperative than
federal habeas corpus, the gravest constitutional
doubts would be engendered as to Section 2255,
as the Court in Hayntan implicitly recognized.58
In the District of Columbia, if a juvenile court
decision is to be attacked collaterally, the remedy,
in most instances, is by way of a Section 2255
motion.Y If the detention involved stems from
-51 See Smith v. United States, 88 U.S. App. D.C. 80,
85-86, 187 F.2d 192, 197-98 (1950), cert. denied, 341
U.S. 927 (1951).
51 342 U.S. 205 (1952).
51 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had,
sua sponte, questioned the validity of Section 2255 and
had treated it as a nullity, Hayman v. United States,
187 F.2d 456 (9th Cir. 1951). See United States v.
Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 209-10 (1952).
11 The basis of the Ninth Circuit's holding in Hayman
was recognized, by the Supreme Court, as being an un-
constitutional "suspension" of habeas corpus. 342 U.S.
at 209. Thus the Court's finding that Section 2255 has
no "purpose to impinge upon prisoner's rights of col-
lateral attack upon their convictions" and that the
Section affords "the same rights [habeas corpus] in
another and convenient forum," implicitly asserts the
coextensiveness of Section 2255 relief with that of ha-
beas corpus. Id. at 219. And such conclusion is sup-
ported by the language of the case notwithstanding the
Court's assertion that "we do not reach constitutional
questions." Id. at 223.
'4 Ibid.
5-1373 U.S. 1 (1963).
56 Id. at 14.
57 Habeas corpus may still be the appropriate remedy
in some cases if the commitment cannot be likened to a
federal custody under federal sentence. In non-juvenile
cases, for example, commitment to a mental institution
may properly be questioned by habeas corpus, not a
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commitment for an antisocial act or course of
conduct, more than likely a Section 2255 motion
will be the exclusive remedy available initially,4u
since a petition for habeas corpus cannot be heard
if a Section 2255 motion may be invoked.0 Con-
sequently, the same considerations which argue for
or against the use of habeas corpus in a juvenile
court system in general are pertinent in examining
the use of Section 2255 in the juvenile court system
in the District of Columbia.
IS HABEAS CoRPus A PROPER R{EMEDY
IN TnE JUVENILE COURT-DELImuENCY
SETTING?
Legal Considerations
A question which one first encounters in ex-
amining the propriety of the use of habeas corpus
in regard to a juvenile court decision is whether
there are legal obstacles in the very foundation of
the system which preclude such collateral attack.
Apart from considerations of policy which will be
discussed later, the question is whether there are
technical legal impediments to habeas corpus in
attacking juvenile court judgments that do not
exist with respect to other legal proceedings.
The novice to the juvenile court system is told
that its proceedings are civil in nature, not criminal,
even when a criminal act is that which has invoked
the court's jurisdiction.60 However, habeas corpus
is not restricted to criminal cases plone." Any
detention, even "executive detention,"12 is subject
to inquiry by means of habeas corpus. Conse-
quently, this distinction between juvenile court
proceedings and those in other judicial forums
should not preclude habeas corpus. On the other
hand, it has been suggested that the type of deten-
tion that results from a juvenile court decision
Section 2255 motion. See, e.g., O'Beirne v. Overholser,
109 U.S. App. D.C. 279, 287 F.2d 137 (1960): Miller v.
Overholser, 92 U.S. App. D.C. 110, 206 F.2d 415 (1953).
Even though such cases might be viewed as excluding
Section 2255 relief in the juvenile court, upon the argu-
ment that no sentence is involved in a juvenile case-
even one involving delinquency determinations, the
fact of commitment for an antisocial act refuses such a
view. See notes 63-65 infra and accompanying text.
Is The issues raised by an attack of a juvenile court
delinquency commitment will most likely be the same
as those issues which would be raised by a habeas corpus
attack of a criminal conviction and sentence, ie., depri-
vation of fundamental constitutional safeguards. Other
questions must, of necessity, be raised by appeal or peti-
tion for rehearing.
9See text accompanying notes 44-45, supra.
60 See note 14 supra.
61 See note 19 supra.
6Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 403 (1963).
should determine whether habeas corpus would be
proper to inquire into a child's detention.
In White v. Reid," a juvenile committed by the
Juvenile Court of the District of Columbia sought
release from the 'District of Columbia jail. In
holding that habeas corpus should be available to
obtain the child's release, the court stated that:
Unless the institution is one whose primary con-
cern is the individual's moral and physical well-
being, unless its facilities are intended for and
adapted to guidance, care, education and
training rather than punishment, unless its
supervision is that of a guardian, not that of a
prison guard or jailor, it seems clear a commit-
ment to such institution is by reason of con-
viction of crime and cannot withstand an assault
for violation of fundamental Constitutional
safeguards.4
The result in White is to assure a child committed
for delinquency that his confinement will not put
him in "communication with those convicted of
crime.16 5 This result obviously comports with the
philosophy of the juvenile court that those de-
tained by the court are not to be punished but
rather to be protected and guided.
The test enunciated in White would seemingly
tolerate a "violation of fundamental Constitutional
safeguards" of a youth provided he is detailed in a
suitable institution. It is the writer's opinion,
however, that, if a juvenile court acts uncon-
stitutionally, the court's action should not be
insulated from assault merely because the juvenile
is in a suitable, or even a happy, confinement.
Neither the civil nature of the proceedings nor the
characteristics of the institution should bar cor-
rection of the deprivation of constitutional rights
by a juvenile court.
Generally juvenile courts are endowed with
broad jurisdiction.66 Consequently, lack of juris-
diction over a child charged with a criminal-type
act would be less frequent in a juvenile court.
Technical grounds for absence of jurisdiction
might exist, however, as in other courts. Thus in
"3 125 F. Supp. 647 (D.D.C. 1954).
"Id. at 650.
6" White v. Reid, 126 F. Supp. 867, 871 (D.D.C.
1954).
66 See National Council on Crime and Delinquency,
STANmAR JUVENILE COURT AcT § 8 (6th ed. 1959)
[hereinafter cited as Standard Juvenile Court Act]. By
the terms of the act, jurisdiction extends, inter alia, to
children (under eighteen years of age) charged with any
law violation, neglected children, children who face
circumstances injurious to their own or to other's wel-
fare, custody determinations, and adoption proceedings.
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Ex Parte Mould,6 the Michigan Supreme Court
held that a juvenile court determination of delin-
quency was void, and subject to habeas corpus
attack, because the proper forum for such deter-
mination was the court of the county wherein the
child resided rather than the court which made the
determination. And in Juvenile Court v. State ex
rel. Humphrey,6 the Supreme Court of Tennessee
permitted habeas corpus to issue where the
juvenile court had exercised authority over a
'juvenile who could have been charged with first
or second degree murder for killing his playmate
with a shotgun. The Tennessee court held that,
since the juvenile court statute required transfer
of such cases to the regular criminal courts, there
was no jurisdiction in the juvenile court to treat
the boy as a delinquent. 69
On the other hand, it has been held that, where
the juvenile court has jurisdiction over the person
and subject matter, habeas corpus will not lie. A
decision to this effect is Lehman v. Montgomery,
70
in which the Indiana Supreme Court refused habeas
corpus to a child's mother who sought her daugh-
ter's release from a girls' reform school claiming,
inter alia, that the child did not have assistance of
counsel in the proceeding resulting in detention.
The Indiana court stated that a writ of habeas
corpus raises only the question of jurisdiction of
the court over the person and subject matter and
that, since the allegations by the applicant did not
demonstrate such lack of jurisdiction, habeas
corpus could not lie.7'
Other state courts, in addition to Indiana's,
have defined the scope of habeas corpus in narrow
terms.12 However, it is now clear that federal
habeas corpus, which is ultimately available to
protect against violation of federal constitutional
safeguards, permits broad inquiryY3 Therefore, the
mere fact that a juvenile court has exercised proper
-' 162 Mich. 1, 126 N.W. 1049 (1910).
68 139 Tenn. 549, 201 S.W. 771 (1918).
69 For an excellent discussion of the jurisdictional de-
fect requirement of habeas corpus in juvenile cases see
Hickey, Habeas Corpus and Juvenile Courts, 15 Juv.
CT. JUDGEs JouR., Summer 1964,p. 7, 8-10.
70 233 Ind. 391, 120 N.E.2d 172 (1954).
11 In Lehman, it should be noted, remedies other than
habeas corpus were available, i.e., the petitioner could
have raised the issues alleged on appeal, but sought
habeas corpus instead. However, the emphasis of the
opinion is the failure to assert jurisdictional defects, not
failure to appeal.
72 See, e.g., Ex parle S.H., 1 Utah 2d 186, 264 P.2d
850 (1953); Parker v. Johnson, 307 Ky. 376, 211 S.W.2d
150 (1948) [both involving custody proceedings].
73 See notes 28-31, supra and accompanying text.
jurisdiction in a particular case should be no legal
obstacle to inquiry into the propriety of its action
by means of habeas corpus.
The jurisdiction of a juvenile court may not
only be broad; it may even be "exclusive and
original." 74 Taken literally such jurisdiction would
preclude other courts from inquiring into the
propriety of a juvenile court decision. However,
the juvenile court statute itself may exempt
habeas corpus proceedings from such exclusiveness
(although the exemption may be limited to
custody determinations), 7 and, even if habeas
corpus were not by the terms of the statute per-
mitted, habeas corpus must necessarily be read
into the system to prevent the institution of the
juvenile court from being found unconstitutional
in that regard.76 The constitutional guarantee of
the privilege of habeas corpus would preclude its
"suspension," even though the propriety of an
othenvise "exclusive" juvenile court decision
would thereby be brought into question.
Generally the statute governing the juvenile
court system in a given jurisdiction will provide
that any order or decision of the juvenile court
may be appealed to the appropriate appellate
court for review by a party aggrievedY. The
existence of such right of appeal would apparently
restrict the use of habeas corpus stringently since
habeas corpus is not proper unless other available
remedies are exhausted.7  People v. Areson79
illustrates this point well. In Areson habeas corpus
was sought for the release of a child adjudged a
delinquent and committed to a State Industrial
School by the New York Children's Court. The
New York court denied the petition, which alleged
a noncompliance with a statutory requirement of
probation investigation and report, on the ground
that the irregularity could be corrected on appeal.
The court noted that the error did not create a
jurisdictional defect, but based its decision pri-
marily upon the existence of the appeal remedy
and the concomitant discretion of the reviewing
court in the exercise of its general equity juris-
diction which would be the only other basis for its
intervention into the case. 0
71 Standard Juvenile Court Act supra note 66, § 8.
75 See D.C. CoDE, tit. 11, § 907 (1961).
76 Failure to permit habeas corpus would raise con-
stitutional questions as to a statute having that effect.
See text accompanying note 87 infra.
77 Standard Juvenile Court Act, supra note 66, § 28.
78 Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174 (1947); Lazuros v.
State, 228 S.W.2d 972 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950). See also
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
7 195 Misc. 609, 91 N.Y.S.2d 121 (Sup. Ct. 1949).81Id. at 611-12,6 1 N.Y.S.2d at 123-24.
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Areson and other cases like it do no more than
point out that habeas corpus is not a proper sub-
stitute for other adequate remedies. If permitted
in such cases, habeas corpus would become a device
whereby one court could "second-guess" another
court in the same case without a showing of a
particularized need.sK However, this limitation on
habeas corpus is not the same as an absolute bar
to the use of the Writ against other legal pro-
ceedings, including those of the juvenile court. This
requirement of exhaustion of other remedies is
merely an inherent limitation upon the use of the
Writ; in other words, habeas corpus may only be
used when other remedies are exhausted.
A corollary of the broad right of appeal in
juvenile cases is the power of a juvenile court to
rehear and modify a decree at any time.s This
power offers a person who is discontented with a
juvenile court decision another remedy which
usually does not exist in other fields of law. This
power serves to extend the limitation upon the
use of habeas corpus in regard to a juvenile court
decision, since it extends the time of the con-
tinuing jurisdiction of the court. As noted in the
Areson case, the continuing jurisdiction of the court
of the first instance, through the availability of
appeal, is the factor which precludes another court
from interferingPn Continuing jurisdiction, there-
fore, prevents collateral attack because the
opportunity exists for correction of the alleged
error by the court allegedly committing the error.
Despite the foregoing considerations, the ques-
tion arises whether one is precluded from seek-
ing habeas corpus relief from a juvenile court
detention at any time on the chance that successive
applications for rehearing will result in the relief
sought. Even if one is required to seek rehearing
before invoking habeas to inquire into a juvenile
court-ordered detention, it would be unreasonable
to bar forever habeas corpus inquiry on the
ground that the juvenile court might sometime
alter its decision. Certainly "grave constitutional
doubts" might be engendered by such interference
with habeas corpus.P
s1 Hickey, supra note 69 at 9-10, suggests that the
only justifiable basis for permitting habeas corpus to be
utilized to attack a juvenile court decision is lack of
jurisdiction, unless a particularized need is shown, be-
cause otherwise there would be judicial second-guessing
as between different courts.
8 Standard Juvenile Court Act, supra note 66, § 26.
83 See note 80 supra. See also Stoker v. Gowans, 45
Utah 556, 147 Pac. 911 (1915).
4 Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 14 (1963).
Of the possible legal obstacles which have been
discussed, the most difficult to overcome are the
broad right of appeal and the continuing power of
the juvenile court to rehear and modify its deci,
sions. However, even these are not complete
roadblocks; rather, they are high hurdles in the
path. The existence of other remedies, as pre-
viously noted, often necessitates the avoidance of
habeas corpus. But, if the goal of habeas corpus is
to insure fair judicial treatment, one should not
be too upset if he can obtain review to that end
without resorting to habeas corpus. For, if the
other remedies do not satisfy, the Great Writ will
still be available to achieve the desired inquiry
when properly invoked.
Policy Considerations
The avowed goal of the juvenile court system is
to insure that "each child coming within the
jurisdiction of the court shall receive, preferably in
his own home, the care, guidance, and control that
will ,conduce to his welfare and the best interests
of the state, and that when he is removed from the
control of his parents the courts shall secure for
him care as nearly as possible equivalent to that
which they should have given him". 5 It will be
noted that this policy statement gives the welfare
of the child priority, at least in written sequence,
over the "best interests of the state." This factor,
more than any other, argues for an isolationist
treatment of the juvenile court system by other
judicial courts and other authoritative bodies.
-The ultimate aim of juvenile courts should be to
cope with the complex problems of juveniles with
a minimum of difficulty, drawing upon the social
sciences when necessary to effect a solution. Such
a court would be more than a court, certainly
different from the traditional judicial court, and
would require a degree of independence un-
paralleled in Anglo-American jurisprudence. For
such a system to function as planned, a funda-
mental imperative is the acceptance of the ability
of the institution of the juvenile court to achieve
its goals in guarding the welfare of the child.
Weighing against the acceptance of the ability
of the juvenile court to act in the best interest of a
child is the other goal of the juvenile court, namely
the protection of the interests of the state. When
this factor is added, the juvenile court as an
institution must function as would a criminal
court when dealing with a child accused of criminal
85 Standard Juvenile Court Act, supra note 68 § 1.
1966]
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acts, or when the court's decision will deprive the
child of liberty as would a criminal proceeding.8 6
When viewed from this angle, it is understandable
that many are reluctant to yield to the appeal for
the independence of the juvenile court. To place
the aim of the welfare of the child in prominence
to the exclusion of recognition of the interests of
the state, so as to accord the juvenile court the
measure of independence it claims, would be to
disregard reality. On the other hand, the fact that
the juvenile court is a watchdog of the state, as
well as a protector of its offspring, does not require
a disavowal of its ability to achieve its particu-
larized goals. Nor does its quasi-criminal character
in delinquency cases require the other extreme:
the complete stringencies of protection of the
individual in traditional criminal cases.
The relevant question then is where the line can
be drawn in relation to the use of such devices as
habeas corpus. It would be unrealistic to think
that a juvenile court can do no wrong so as to
preclude the necessary collateral attack of its
decisions. But it would defeat the purposes of the
juvenile court to permit every decision to be sub-
jected to wholesale collateral judicial scrutiny.
CONCLUSION
The legal basis of habeas corpus relief minimally
requires that violation of constitutional safeguards
by a juvenile court be subject to inquiry and
correction through the Writ. The technical
applicability of habeas relief in the state courts
may vary and may be more narrow than the
86 When a juvenile court hears a case in which a child
is charged with a criminal act and the court seeks to
protect the interests of the state, the court functions to
serve the same goals that a criminal court would.
federal remedy, but ultimately, fundamental con-
stitutional claims must be given a forum via habeas
corpus. Thus, there seems little room for argument
that the juvenile court system is immune from
habeas proceedings attacking its decisions. Nor
does the use of habeas corpus appear to be re-
stricted to attacking custody determinations by a
juvenile court, such use of the Writ being virtually
unquestioned over the years.
The general limitations upon the use of habeas
corpus are, however, extended by certain char-
acteristics of the juvenile court system. The broad
right to appeal from a juvenile court decision and
the continuing power of the juvenile court to alter
a decision lessen the necessity for turning to
habeas corpus for an inquiry into an allegedly
illegal detention. In fact, these attributes of the
juvenile court probably prevent extensive use of
habeas corpus in attacking juvenile court deten-
tions. Since remedies other than habeas corpus are
available, one seeking habeas corpus-type relief
must turn to those remedies as he would in the
traditional legal setting. This factor may explain
the dearth of cases in which a delinquency deten-
tion is attacked by habeas corpus.P
8 See note 17 supra.
8 Very few cases have been found involving habeas
corpus related to a delinquency proceeding, much less
which discuss the propriety of habeas corpus in such
cases. Among those found other than in the District of
Columbia and aside from those involving bail are:
Lehman v. Montgomery, 233 Ind. 391, 120 N.E.2d
172 (1954); Ex parte Mould, 162 Mich. 1, 126 N.W.
1049 (1910); People v. Areson, 195 Misc. 609, 91
N.Y.S.2d 121 (Sup. Ct. 1949); In re Boughton, 263
App. Div. 1049,33 N.Y.S.2d 740 (1942); Juvenile Court
v. State ex rd. Humphrey, 139 Tenn. 549, 201 S.W. 771
(1918); Stoker v. Gowans, 45 Utah 556, 147 Pac. 911
(1915); State v. Adams, 145 W. Va. 194, 113 S.E.2d
830 (1960).
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